Recent Developments Concerning Environmental Law and Agriculture by Malone, Linda A.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2002
Recent Developments Concerning Environmental
Law and Agriculture
Linda A. Malone
William & Mary Law School, lamalo@wm.edu
Copyright c 2002 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Malone, Linda A., "Recent Developments Concerning Environmental Law and Agriculture" (2002). Faculty Publications. Paper 221.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/221
RECENTDEVELOPMENTSCONCERNITNG 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AGRICULTURE 
Linda A. Malone· 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction .......................................................................................... 341 
ll. Supreme Court Cases ........................................................................... 342 
ill. Developments Relating to the Endangered Species Act ...................... 349 
N. Pesticides and Herbicides ..................................................................... 356 
V. Clean Water Act and Related Developments ....................................... 359 
VI. Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations ........................................... 368 
Vll. The TMDL Program ............................................................................ 370 
Vill. Wetlands Regulation ............................................................................ 373 
IX. Conclusion .......................................................................................... 380 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental regulation of agriculture stands at a critical and contro-
versial juncture. This juncture is not so much the result of changes in environ-
mental requirements, as it is the result of a gradual and inevitable extension of 
environmental regulation to previously unregulated areas of agriculture. The 
relative immunity of nonpoint source pollution to mandatory regulation, for ex-
ample, may be extinguished in proposed regulations for impaired waters and 
concentrated animal feedlots. The regulatory threat, however, is tempered by 
court decisions that are more inclined to place limits on the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's ("EPA") regulatory authority or to require compensation for 
regulatory takings. If this tension between the regulators and the courts continue, 
all that can be said with certainty is that the controversial regulation of impaired 
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waters, wetlands, endangered species, concentrated animal feedlot operations, 
and nonpoint source pollution will be lengthy, divisive, and subject to political 
pressure. 
IT. SUPREME COURT CASES 
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,1 petitioner claimed the state's action, in 
applying its wetlands regulation to prevent the development of wetlands on his 
property, constituted a regulatory taking without just compensation, as required 
by the Fifth Arnendment.2 The Rhode Island Superior Courr and state Supreme 
Court rejected the claim on several grounds.4 The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
found the petitioner's takings claim was not yet ripe, despite the state's actions in 
denying two of petitioner's requests for a permit to develop his property.s The 
court determined that doubt still remained as to whether the state would grant a 
permit for a less extensive development of the land in question, and therefore the 
state's action was not a final decision.6 Moreover, the court held that petitioner 
could not bring a regulatory takings claim based on a regulation that existed be-
fore petitioner acquired legal ownership of the property in question.' The court 
additionally held that even if these impediments to petitioner's claim had not 
existed, it would nevertheless have found that no taking had occurred. 8 The court 
held that the petitioner could not establish that the economic value of his property 
had been totally destroyed, under the total taking standard established in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Councif.9 The court reasoned that because the portion of 
petitioner's property that was not covered by the regulation was still worth 
$200,000, petitioner could also not succeed under the more general reasonable 
investment backed standard set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City 
of New York. 10 The court found the petitioner could not have any reasonable ex-
I. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
2. See id. at 611. 
3. See Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 86-1496, 1995 WL 941370 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1995) [hereinafter Palazzolo]. 
4. See Palazzolo v. State ex rei. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000) [hereinafter Ta-
vares]. 
5. See id. at 714. 
6. Seeid. 
7. Seeid. at715. 
8. See id. at 717. 
9. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
10. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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pectations of profitable use, given the regulation preventing the development was 
in place when the petitioner acquired the property.•• 
The Supreme Court disagreed with most of the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court's holdings}2 The Court found the state's actions in denying petitioner's 
permits did constitute of a fmal decision, despite the fact the petitioner had not 
sought permits for projects involving a significantly smaller portion of his wet-
lands, due to the rationale given by the state for the refusal of the permits.13 The 
regulation in question did not permit any development of wetlands unless a 
"compelling public purpose" was served, irrespective of the amount of wetlands 
involved, and the state had already indicated in its denial of petitioner's permit 
applications that the petitioner's purpose did not serve a compelling public inter-
est.14 The Court found the state had decided there would be no permitting of or-
dinary development on wetlands, and therefore petitioner's claim was ripe with-
out further applications or other state action. 15 
The Court also found that a purchaser or successive titleholder is not 
necessarily barred from pursuing a takings claim resulting from a regulation in 
place before the acquisition of the property, even though the new titleholder was 
on notice about the regulation.16 The Court held that one of the purposes of the 
Takings Clause was to enable citizens to compel compensation for state actions 
that were manifestly unreasonable and onerous, and that manifestly unreasonable 
actions did not become less unreasonable as time passed or ownership interests 
changed.17 The Court further pointed out that such a rule penalize new owners 
for the failure of previous owners to protest possibly unreasonable state actions, 
when the previous owners may have been unable or unwilling to take action.18 
Having dealt with these preliminary bars to petitioner's claim, the Court 
proceeded to evaluate the substance of petitioner's claim. The Court agreed with 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court that the petitioner did not have a claim for a 
total taking, since petitioner had accepted the lower court's determination that the 
remainder of petitioner's property was still worth $200,000, passing over peti-
tioner's argument that the wetland and other portions of the property were dis-
11. See Tavares, 146 A.2d at 715-17. 
12. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632. 
13. See id. at 619. 
14. See id. at 619-20. 
15. See id. at 624-25. 
16. See id. at 626. 
17. See id. at 627. 
18. Seeid. 
344 Drake Journal of Agricultural Law [Vol. 7 
tinct segments due to the fact it was not raised at the lower levels. 19 However, the 
Court remanded on the issue of whether the regulation and permit denials de-
stroyed petitioner's reasonable investment backed expectations, because the 
lower court based its rejection of this claim on its incorrect holding that petitioner 
could have no claim and no reasonable expectations of profit when the regulation 
was in existence before petitioner acquired the property. 20 
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army 
Corps of Engineers,21 petitioner had sought a section 404 permit from the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to fill wetlands for the purpose of 
building a waste disposal site.22 The wetlands in question had developed from 
abandoned sand and gravel mining pits and were isolated, completely intrastate 
wetlands, neither connected nor adjacent to any interstate waters.23 However, it 
was discovered that migratory birds frequented the wetlands.24 Under section 
404 of the Clean Water Act ("CW A"), the Corps has the authority to issue or 
deny permits "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable wa-
ters''25 with "navigable waters" being further defmed as the "waters of the United 
States, including the territorial seas.'026 The Corps had a regulation further defm-
ing that intrastate waters may be considered to be waters of the United States 
when they are or could be used as habitat by either birds protected under Migra-
tory Bird Treaties, other migratory birds that cross state lines, or endangered spe-
cies, as well as when water from such bodies is used to irrigate interstate crops.27 
This Corps regulation was known as the Migratory Bird Rule.28 Upon discover-
ing the site was used as habitat by birds that migrated across state lines, the Corps 
denied the permit on the basis of the Migratory Bird Rule.29 This decision was 
challenged by petitioner under the Administrative Procedure Act, on the alterna-
tive grounds that either the Corps had exceeded its statutory authority in applying 
19. Seeid.at630-31. 
20. See id. at 632. 
21. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 
U.S. 159 (2001), remanded to 2001 WL 31272 (7th Cir. 2001). 
22. See id. at 162-63. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. at 164. 
25. Id. at 163 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)). 
26. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)). 
27. See id. at 164 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217). 
28. See id. at 164 n.l (The Court noted that "[t]he Corps issued the 'Migratory Bird 
Rule' without following the notice and conunent procedures outlined in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C.§ 553"). 
29. See id. at 165. 
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the CW A to gain jurisdiction over these intrastate waters, or that Congress had 
exceeded its Commerce Clause power to regulate such intrastate waters if activi-
ties on such waters, taken cumulatively, had a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.30 Noting the substantial contributions activities relating to migratory 
birds made to interstate commerce, the Court found that the cumulative impact 
did in fact exist for such regulation.31 The Court of Appeals found that Congress 
intended for the Act to reach as many waters as possible, and therefore the 
Corps' Migratory Bird Rule was a reasonable interpretation of its jurisdiction 
under the Act.32 However, upon review, the Supreme Court reversed this deci-
sion, fmding that the CW A did not authorize the Corps to have jurisdiction over 
isolated, intrastate waters based on the Migratory Bird Rule.33 
The Court stated that although it had previously recognized in United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 34 that the word "navigable" was of 
limited importance in determining Clean Water Act jurisdiction, it was not 
prepared to completely negate the word's presence by failing to require any 
significant nexus between waters to be regulated and actual navigable waters.3s 
The Court pointed out that Bayview Homes involved wetlands that were adjacent 
to open, navigable waters, and as such, although not navigable in themselves, 
were "inseparably bound up" with the waters of the United States, as opposed to 
the wetlands in this case, which the Court found to be completely isolated and 
not bound up with any water of the United States.36 The Court therefore held that 
the CW A by its language did not extend to these waters.37 
The Corps attempted to argue that, regardless of whether the CW A was 
originally intended to cover such isolated, intrastate waters, Congress had acqui-
esced in such jurisdiction, as evidenced by the failure of legislation presented at 
the time of the 1977 amendments to the CW A that explicitly attempted to limit 
the Corps' expansive interpretation of its jurisdiction.38 However, the Court held 
that congressional acquiescence to administrative interpretations is never to be 
lightly assumed, and failed legislative bills alone are generally insufficient to 
demonstrate such acquiescence, given the wide variety of reasons why a bill 
30. Seeid. 
31. See id. 
32. See id. at 166. 
33. See id. at 174. 
34. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
35. See Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County, 531 U.S. at 172. 
36. See id. at 167-68. 
37. Seeid.at171-72. 
38. See id. at 168-69. 
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might be proposed or faii.l9 The Court did not find sufficient other legislative 
history to reinforce the Corps' claim that the failed bill indicated acquiescence, 
and therefore rejected this argument.40 
The Corps further argued, even if the statute and the legislative history 
did not demonstrate that Congress intended to give the Corps jurisdiction over 
non-navigable, intrastate waters, Congress at the very least failed to address the 
issue one way or the other, and therefore the Court should give Chevron defer-
ence in this instance.41 The Court stated Chevron deference does not apply when 
an agency's interpretation of a statute stretches the limits of Congress' power, as 
this interpretation would stretch Congress' Commerce Clause power, lest the 
Court needlessly fmd constitutional issues that Congress did not intend to casu-
ally create.42 The Court held that such an interpretation would only be accepted 
when clear indications were present to demonstrate that Congress really did in-
tend to utilize the utmost boundaries of its constitutional power.43 
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the United States District 
Court after determining the United States Army Corps of Engineers exceeded 
their authority under section 404(b) of the CW A.44 The district court was in-
structed to decide whether the Migratory Bird Rule was the only proper basis for 
the Corps' requirement of a permit or if alternate grounds of jurisdiction could be 
utilized that would not be inconsistent with the opinion of the Court.45 The Court 
held that if the district court found that the Corps' authority in this case relies on 
the Migratory Bird Rule alone, the action must be dismissed.46 If the district 
court found other valid bases for jurisdiction, further proceedings would be con-
ducted in accordance with the judgment ofthe Supreme Court.47 
In response to the Court's ruling, the Corps changed its working defmi-
tion of "wetlands," removing the category for isolated, solely intrastate water 
bodies.48 The Corps expected litigation in response to this change, but viewed 
the change as a positive first step, and expected to issue further guidance in the 
39. See id. at 169-70. 
40. See id. at 170. 
41. See id. at 172. 
42. See id. at 172-74. 
43. See id. at 174. 
44. See Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps ofEng'rs, No. 98-
2277,2001 WL 312372, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 29, 2001). 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. See id. 
48. See Court Decision on Isolated Waters Prompts Army Corps to Revise Definition, 
69 U.S.L.W. (BNA) No. 33, at 2561 (Mar. 20, 2001). 
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form of policy guidance documents in response to the decision.49 In addition, the 
ruling was expected to increase the regulatory burden on states, as a large per-
centage of the nation's wetlands will no longer be covered by federal regula-
tion.50 The new ruling would limit the scope of regulation to about twenty per-
cent of the nation's wetlands, eliminating regulation for wet meadows, forested 
wetlands, vernal pools, non-navigable streams and rivers, and large portions of 
the Alaskan tundra.51 Only fourteen states have regulations that would fill the 
gap created under this ruling. 52 Authorities feared that many wetlands would go 
unprotected and called for the development of new state programs. 53 
On a sharply divided court, Judge Reinhardt of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that development moratoria cannot result in 
compensable takings under First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County 
of Los Angeles,54 even when they deprive owners of all economically beneficial 
use of land for extended periods. 55 The United States Supreme Court granted cert 
in the case, Tahoe-Sie"a Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency,56 to determine if a moratorium constitutes a taking within the elusive 
notion of a temporary taking. 57 
The district court ruled that the agency's temporary moratorium had 
worked a compensable temporary taking. 58 It stressed that the regulation "denied 
the plaintiffs all economically viable use of their property."59 Furthermore, al-
though the regulation ''was clearly intended to be temporary, since it was adopted 
pending the enactment of a new regional plan, there was no fixed date for when it 
would terminate.''60 In addition, the court expressed skepticism about whethe..r 
development "moratoria remain[ ed] legitimate planning tools after First Eng-
49. See id. 
50. See State Regulatory Burden May Increase After Recent U.S. Supreme Court Deci-
sion, 69 U.S.L. W. (BNA) No. 31, at 2491 (Feb. 20, 200 l ). 
51. See id. 
52. Seeid. 
53. See id. at 2492. 
54. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 305 (1987). 
55. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg') Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 
777-78 (9th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Tahoe-Sie"a Pres. Council II]. 
56. Seeid. 
57. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg') Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 
1465 (2002) [hereinafter Tahoe-Sie"a Pres. Council Ill]. 
58. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 
2d 1226, 1251 (D. Nev. 1999). 
59. /d. at 1249. 
60. /d. at 1250. 
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/ish.'761 Although some courts have upheld such moratoria, the district court con-
sidered these possibly consistent with the Supreme Court's allowance for normal 
delays.62 It distinguished moratoria like those in First English, which had no 
expiration date, from the interim planning moratorium, which is enacted with a 
deadline and usually extends for a short period.63 In the latter case, the govern-
ment's culpability would be less. However, in the present case, "[e]nacting an 
unconstitutional ordinance with no plans to end it is different than simply putting 
a hold on development for a few months while trying to formulate a plan under 
which development will be possible. '764 
Judge Reinhardt's Ninth Circuit opinion attacked the district court's ba-
sic premise: 
It is true that First English holds that, when a taking has occurred, the government 
must compensate property owners, even if the taking is "temporary." Contrary to 
the plaintiffs' suggestion, however, the Court's holding in First English was not that 
temporary moratoria are "temporary takings." In fact, the opposite is true. The 
First English Court very carefully defined "'temporary' regulatory takings [as] 
those regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by the courts." (Citations 
omitted) What is ''temporary," according to the Court's definition, is not the regula-
tion; rather, what is ''temporary" is the taking, which is rendered temporary only 
when an ordinance that effects a taking is struck down by a court. In other words, a 
permanent regulation leads to a "temporary" taking when a court invalidates the or-
dinance after the taking. (Citations omitted) The Court's definition, therefore, does 
not comprehend temporary moratoria, which from the outset are designed to last for 
only a limited period of time. In short, we reject the plaintiffs' contentions that First 
English applies to temporary moratoria and that it works a radical change to takings 
law by requiring that property interests be carved up into finite temporal segments. 65 
The Ninth Circuit opinion discussed at some length the court's rejection of "con-
ceptual severance" of parcels, citing Professor Margaret Jane Radin for the 
proposition that "[a] planning regulation that prevents the development of a par-
cel for a temporary period of time is conceptually no different than a land-use 
restriction that permanently denies all use on a discrete portion of property, or 
that permanently restricts a type of use across all of the parcel.'766 Each of these 
61. /d. at 1249. 
62. See id. (citing Santa Fe Viii. Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 914 F. Supp. 478, 483 
(D.N.M. 1995); Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195, 1206-07 (N.D. Cal. 1988)). 
63. Seeid. 
64. /d. 
65. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council II, 216 F.3d at 778. 
66. /d. at 776 (citing Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross 
Currents in the Jurisprudence ofTakings, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1674-78 (1988)). 
2002] Developments Concerning Environmental Law and Agriculture 349 
three types of regulation will have an impact on the parcel's value, because each 
will affect an aspect of the owner's use of the property-by restricting when the 
use may occur, where the use may occur, or how the use may occur. However, 
Judge Reinhardt's Ninth Circuit opinion did concede that 
were a temporary moratorium designed to be in force so long as to eliminate all pre-
sent value of a property's future use, we might be compelled to conclude that a 
categorical taking had occurred. We doubt, however, that a true temporary morato-
rium would ever be designed to last for so long a period.67 
The Ninth Circuit denied en bane review,68 over strong dissent by Judge 
Kozinski.69 He asserted that the panel decision written by Judge Reinhardt "does 
not like the Supreme Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence very much, so it re-
verses First English, and adopts Justice Stevens's First English dissent."70 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, affirmed the decision of the 
Ninth Circuit.71 The Court held that a moratorium does not constitute a per se 
taking and that the question of whether the takings clause requires the govern-
ment to pay compensation for enacting a temporary regulation that denies prop-
erty owners all viable economic use of their property is not decided by any cate-
gorical rule, but rather by applying the factors of Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City.12 
Ill. DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass 'n v. United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service73 involved the United States Department of Fish and Wildlife Services' 
critical habitat designation of a species listed as endangered, the Southwestern 
Willow Flycatcher.74 The Endangered Species Act ("ESA") requires the Fish and 
67. Id. at 781. 
68. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d 998 
(9th Cir. 2000) (denying rehearing en bane). 
69. See id. at 999 (Kozinski, J., dissenting, joined by O'Scannlain, Trott, T.G. Nelson, 
and Kleinfeld, JJ.). 
70. Id. (citing First English, 482 U.S. 304); see also Steven J. Eagle, Just Compensation 
for Permanent Takings ofTemporal Interests, 4 Fed. Cir. B. J. 485,487 (2001). 
71. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council Ill, 122 S. Ct. at 1465. 
72. See id.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104. 
73. See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277 
(lOth Cir. 2001). 
74. See id. at 1279. 
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Wildlife Services to make an economic analysis of the impact of any critical 
habitat designation before. fmalizing it.75 In making its economic analyses, Fish 
and Wildlife Services had adopted an "incremental baseline approach" to the 
economic effects, whereby economic effects that flow from the listing of the spe-
cies, rather than the selection of a particular habitat designation, were below the 
"baseline" and not to be considered in the determination of economic impact.16 
Using the baseline method, Fish and Wildlife Services determined that the criti-
cal habitat designation had resulted in no economic effects beyond those that 
were caused by the listing of the species.77 Petitioners challenged the designation 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, primarily on the basis that the baseline 
approach violated the ESA, claiming that the ESA requires that all economic 
effect be considered when making a critical habitat designation.78 The district 
court upheld the Fish and Wildlife Services methodology/9 but the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed.80 
The court began its analysis by stating that the district court erred in giv-
ing Chevron deference to Fish and Wildlife Services' interpretation of the ESA, 
because this interpretation had never undergone the rule-making process.81 The 
court proceeded to give the proper standard, whether the agency's interpretation 
was "well-reasoned" and had the "power to persuade."82 The court then decided 
that since the baseline approach renders the economic analysis required by Con-
gress virtually meaningless, the baseline approach had to be in violation of the 
language and intent of the argument that including economic impacts that are 
caused, or at least co-extensively caused, by the listing itself, rather than the des-
ignation, would cause economic concerns to become a factor in the listing proc-
ess, something that is forbidden by the ESA.83 The court found that the consid-
eration of economic factors at a point subsequent to listing could not have an 
effect on the process of the prior listing, nor diminish the protections offered by 
the listing, but rather would result in such economic factors influencing the deci-
75. See id. at 1280 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (b)(2)). 
76. See id. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. 
79. See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 81 F. Supp. 
2d 1141, 1162 (D.N.M. 1999). 
80. See id., rev'd, New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 
F.3d 1277 (lOth Cir. 2001). 
81. See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass 'n., 248 F.3d at 1281. 
82. See id. (quoting Fristoe v. Thompson, 144 F.3d 627,631 (lOth Cir. 1998)). 
83. See id. at 1284-85. 
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sion of which areas should be designated as critical habitat, which was in fact 
what Congress had intended.84 
Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage District v. United StatesB5 involved 
contractual water use rights and when regulatory interference with those rights 
may constitute a taking.86 In this area, the water supply is primarily managed by 
the Central Valley Project, run by the Federal Bureau of Reclamation, and the 
State Water Project, run by the Department of Water Resources, projects which 
share a coordinated pumping system and must therefore be run in concert with 
each other.87 Both projects are granted water permits by the State Water Re-
sources Control Board to withdraw or use certain amounts of water from the 
Feather and Sacramento Rivers.88 The projects in turn had contracted with cer-
tain of the plaintiffs in this matter, giving the plaintiffs the right to withdraw or 
use a certain amount ofthe water, and those plaintiffs had by contract given those 
rights to certain other plaintiffs for irrigation and other purposes.89 
In 1992, the National Marine Fisheries Service discovered that the opera-
tion of the projects was likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the Chi-
nook salmon population, in violation of the ESA.90 This situation was further 
complicated by the discovery, the following year, that the projects would also 
jeopardize the continued existence of the delta smelt.91 The agency determined 
that the "reasonable and prudent alternative" that would prevent the federal activ-
ity from jeopardizing the species' existence, as required by the ESA, would in-
volve restrictions on the time and manner in which the water was purnped.92 
These restrictions resulted in plaintiffs being deprived of the water for which they 
had contracted.93 The plaintiffs proceeded to bring a takings claim under the 
Fifth Amendment, claiming that they were being forced to bear the entire cost, in 
terms of water, of a public burden.94 Plaintiffs argued that this was essentially 
equivalent to a physical taking of the water property right, since the govern-
ment's action completely destroyed the water property's economic uses, as per 
84. See id. at 1285. 
85. Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001). 
86. See id. 
87. Seeid.at314. 
88. See id. at 315. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. at 316. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. 
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the Lucas95 standard.96 The defendant countered with three arguments: that the 
restrictions on water merely resulted in the frustration of the water contracts' 
purpose, and were therefore not a taking under Omnia Commercial Co. v. United 
States;97 that there were no reasonable investment backed expectations nor a sub-
stantial decrease in value as would be required by the standard for use interfer-
ence takings, as set forth by Penn Central;98 and the federal government cannot 
be liable for a taking when it merely imposes a limitation that state law would 
otherwise require.99 Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the court 
granted plaintiff's motion.100 
The court began by distinguishing the facts of this case from the situation 
in Omnia Commercial Company v. United States. 101 Contrary to the defendant's 
claims, the court found in this case, the ownership of the right to use specified 
quantities of water had already been transferred to the plaintiffs, whose property 
interests in the water and its use were thereby superior to all others, and therefore 
not subject to Omnia. 102 
The court proceeded to evaluate the nature of the taking in this instance, 
and decided the government's action was, as plaintiffs argued, such a deprivation 
of and interference with plaintiffs' property that it was as complete as a physical 
taking, and therefore automatically required compensation, 103 according to Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 104 The court rejected defendant's argument 
that this case should be analyzed as a potential regulatory, substantial use inter-
ference taking under Penn Central, pointing out that although the regulation in 
question might merely be the typical regulatory restriction on use, in the area of 
water rights, the entire property right consists of the right to use the water, and to 
95. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. 
96. See Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 318. 
97. See Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502,508-11 (1923). 
98. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104. 
99. See Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 317-20. 
100. See id. at 314, 324. 
101. Omnia, 261 U.S. at 502. In Omina the Plaintiff had contracted for the right to pur-
chase steel plate at a below market price, but was subsequently unable to do so, because the United 
States requisitioned all of the Defendant's steel plate. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment only applied to an actual appropriation of a property, not any of the side effects of the 
appropriation, and that although the actual owner of the steel would have been due just compensa-
tion, the government had no obligation to compensate an individual who merely had a contractual 
expectation of receiving the property. See id. 
102. See Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 317-18. 
103. See id. at 318. 
104. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
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restrict use is to restrict the whole right. 105 The court further supported its posi-
tion by pointing to previous case law indicating that a seizure of water rights is to 
be treated as a physical taking, wherever the diversion or withdrawal of the water 
occurred.106 
As a fmal matter, the court dealt with the defendant's claim that either 
the language of the contracts or other requirements of state law limited the plain-
tiffs' titles in their water property rights. 107 The court agreed that the contract 
language specified that the Department of Water Resources, the state permitting 
agency, could not be held liable for water shortages beyond their control, which 
would presumably include shortages imposed by the federal govemment.108 
However, the court pointed out, the fact that the state agency was contractually 
immune from such liability merely provided a breach of contract defense, rather 
than turning the nature of the plaintiffs' water rights into a contingent interest.109 
Moreover, the provision did not provide the federal government with immu-
nity.110 Similarly, the court agreed that if plaintiffs' water use was unreasonable 
or violative of the public trust, then plaintiffs could have no vested interest in the 
water under California law, but disagreed with defendant's argument that the 
plaintiffs' use was unreasonable because it would interfere with the salmon and 
the delta smelt. 111 Instead, the court agreed with the plaintiffs' argument that the 
state's formal allocation of water rights reflected the state's view of the water's 
reasonable use, and absent a reallocation of the state's water by the state, which 
did not happen here, the state had recognized as reasonable the Department of 
Water Resources' right to contract out the use of the water which it was allo-
cated.112 
In Kandra v. United States, 113 plaintiffs, in the process of challenging the 
United States Bureau of Reclamations Annual Operating Plan for the Klamath 
Reclamation Project, sought to obtain a preliminary injunction enjoining the im-
plementation of the plan. 114 To keep from jeopardizing the endangered Lost 
River and Shortnose Sucker fish, a main staple of the Klamath and Yurok Tribes, 
105. See Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 318-20. 
106. See id. at 319 (citing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); see also United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931)). 
107. See Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 320-21. 
108. See id. at 321. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
Ill. See id. at 321-22. 
112. See id. at 322-23. 
113: See Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001). 
114. See id. at 1192. 
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who hold fishing and water treaty rights in the Klamath River Basin, and the 
threatened coho salmon, the Bureau of Reclamations determined to maintain 
water elevations of the Upper Klamath Lake and water flows below the Iron Gate 
Dam at a certain level. liS However, the maintenance of those water levels would 
result in no irrigation water deliveries to the majority of land within the Klamath 
Reclamation Project, since insufficient water would be present to support both 
uses! 16 
The court began by stating the standard for a preliminary injunction: a 
party "must show either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and 
the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) that serious questions are raised and 
the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor." 117 The court first sought to 
determine whether the hardships would fall much more heavily upon the plaintiff 
in this case. 118 The court recognized that the plaintiffs would suffer severe hard-
ship to both their economic interests and their way of life if the Bureau of Rec-
lamations deprived the plaintiffs of irrigation water. 119 On the other hand, the 
court found this hardship was balanced by several other hardships that would 
occur if the plan was not implemented.120 These hardships included jeopardy to 
the continuing existence of endangered species, a possible hardship that was 
given the highest priority by Congress in the Endangered Species Act, harm to 
the livelihood and tribal customs of the Klamath and Yurok Tribes, and eco-
nomic harm and deprivation of a way of life for other fishing communities.121 In 
balancing these interests, the court was unable to find that the balance of hardship 
was more heavily weighted on one side than the other.122 
The court then proceeded to evaluate the likelihood of the success of the 
plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs alleged two breach of contract claims: that the Bu-
reau of Reclamation breached its contract "by using Project water for purposes 
other than irrigation," and that the Bureau of Reclamation breached its contract 
with plaintiffs by failing to ensure that the water supply remained sufficient to 
meet the contract obligations.123 The court found the plaintiffs' contract rights to 
irrigation water were subservient to the Endangered Species Act and tribal trust 
115. See id. at 1195-98. 
116. See id. at 1199. 
117. /d. (citing Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839-40 
(9th Cir. 2001)). 
118. See id. at 1200. 
119. See id. at 1200-01. 
120. See id. at 120 1. 
121. See id. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
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requirements, thereby rejecting plaintiffs flrst breach of contract claim. 124 The 
court also rejected the plaintiffs' second breach of contract argument, stating that 
the plaintiffs had provided little evidence that the Bureau of Reclamation could 
have preserved the water by asserting claims against junior users. 125 Moreover, 
the Bureau of Reclamation would have been prevented from doing so while 
"[ w ]ater rights adjudication for the Klamath River Basin to perfect asserted water 
rights ... " was pending in the state courts.126 
Plaintiffs also claimed the Bureau of Reclamation violated both the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (''NEP A"), by failing to make an Environmental 
Impact Statement regarding the effects implementation of the plan would have, 
and the ESA in a variety of ways. 127 Neither NEPA nor the ESA provide a pri-
vate cause of action, so the plaintiffs' claims had to be brought under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act ("AP A"), and would succeed only if the plaintiffs could 
show the Bureau of Reclamation's acts were arbitrary and capricious. 128 The 
court did not flnd sufficient evidence to show that the agency's actions had been 
arbitrary and capricious. 129 It further pointed out that even if the actions were 
arbitrary and capricious, the AP A can only force an agency to set aside a deci-
sion, not to compel an action. 130 This means that even if the agency were to suc-
ceed in forcing the Bureau of Reclamation to set aside its plan, they could not 
force it to continue to release water for irrigation, as the preliminary injunction 
would require. 131 
On July 10, 2000, the National Marine Fisheries Service published the 
fmal section 4( d) rule of the ESA, delegating power to manage species protection 
and recovery to state and local levels.132 This revolutionary approach allows 
secretaries to "extend all endangered species protections to threatened species."133 
124. See id. 
125. See id. 
126. Id. (several pre-1909 water rights claims to the Upper Klamath Lake had been filed 
in state court). 
127. See id. at 1202. 
128. See id. 
129. See generally id. at 1202-05 (discussing the requirement of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act and the Reclamation Bureau's failure to fulfill the requirements). 
130. See id. at 1205. 
131. See id. 
132. See Endangered and Threatened Species; Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threat-
ened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422, 42,476-
42,480 (July 10, 2000) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223). 
133. See Valerie Ann Lee & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, Breathing New Life Into the ESA: The 
Pacific Northwest's Endangered Species Act Experiment in Devolution, 31 Envtl. L. Rev. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10,102, 10,103 (Jan. 2001). 
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Section 4( d) requires each secretary to issue "such regulations as he deems nec-
essary and advisable to provide for the conservation" of threatened species.134 
The Department of Commerce issued a final rule under section 4( d) of 
the ESA, in reference to fourteen species of salmon and steelheads.m A few 
months later a group of Pacific Northwest irrigators filed a petition "to remove 
seven populations of Columbia basin salmon and steelhead from the 'endan-
gered' or 'threatened' lists."136 Many more petitions seem likely as a result of a 
district court opinion that the National Marine Fisheries Service erred when list-
ing only wild and not hatchery-reared Oregon coastal coho salmon because the 
ESA does not allow part of a population of fish to be listed.137 
IV. PESTICIDES AND HERBICIDES 
In No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 138 an environmental 
group attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction against the City of New York 
under a provision of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA") to pre-
vent the city from restarting its insecticide spraying over the city.139 To obtain a 
preliminary injunction, a party must show either a likelihood of success on the 
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or that serious questions are raised 
and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. 140 However, when the 
plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction against a "government action taken in the 
public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, the injunction should 
be granted only if the moving party meets the more rigorous likelihood-of-
success standard."141 To have any likelihood of succeeding in its claim, the plain-
tiff had to show under RCRA that the defendant had "discarded" the insecti-
cides. 142 The court stated a product is not discarded until after it has been used 
for its intended purpose. 143 With respect to the insecticides being sprayed into the 
134. 16 u.s.c. § 1533(d) (1994). 
135. See Endangered and Threatened Species; Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threat-
ened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. at 42,422-42,481. 
136. First Salmon Delisting Petition Filed in Northwest as Result of Court Ruling, 32 
Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1928 (Oct. 5, 2001). 
137. See Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1154-64 (D. Or. 2001). 
138. No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 252 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001). 
139. See id. at 149. 
140. See id. at 150 (citing Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 
270 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
141. Jd. (quoting Beal v. Stem, 184 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
142. See id. 
143. See id. 
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air by the defendant, their intended purpose was to kill mosquitoes and the mos-
quitoes' larvae, so a suit under the RCRA would be unlikely to succeed in those 
or similar circumstances. 1•44 
In American Farm Bureau v. United States Environmental Protection 
Agency,145 twenty-five organizations challenged the EPA's implementation of the 
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996,146 which amends both the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act {"FFDCA")147 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA").148 The FFDCA permits private actions against the 
EPA if it fails to comply with the statutory schedule for reassessing the maxi-
mum allowable level of pesticide residue in food that is permissible under the 
FFDCA.149 Defendant EPA moved to dismiss the complaint based on failure of 
the counts to meet AP A requirements, plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies, claims not ripe, claims lacking in standing, and lack of jurisdiction.150 
Reviewing the two-prong test subsequent to TRAC/ 51 and discussing case law 
subsequent to TRAC, 152 the court held that because TRAC analysis of the FFDCA 
144. 
145. 
146. 
(1996). 
147. 
148. 
(2000). 
See id. (holding that city's spraying of insecticide did not violate RCRA). 
See Am Farm Bureau v. E.P.A., 121 F. Supp. 2d. 84 (D.O. C. 2000). 
See Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 
See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (2000). 
See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide on Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y 
149. See Am. Farm Bureau, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 96 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 346(q)(3)). 
150. See id. at 90. 
151. See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 77-79 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (holding that a petition seeking a writ of mandamus to force the FCC to act was subject 
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals because 28 U.S. C. § 2342(1) (1982) & 47 
U.S.C. § 402(a) (1982) authorized exclusive jurisdiction to review final FCC action). The court 
reasoned that the Court of Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction to make decisions that could affect 
the circuit court's future jurisdiction, and that the district court Jacked concurrent jurisdiction based 
on the principle that when Congress explicitly vests jurisdiction with one court, it cuts off original 
jurisdiction in other courts. See id. at 76-77. The two prong test developed after TRAG asks: "(I} 
does the statute commit review of agency action to the court of appeals and (2) does the action seek 
relief that might affect the circuit court's jurisdiction?" Am. Farm Bureau, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 91 
(citing Jamison v. FTC, 628 F. Supp. 1548, 1550 (D.D.C. 1986)). 
152. See Am. Farm Bureau, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 91-92; Cal. v. Riley, 750 F. Supp. 433 
(E.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that limited appellate review provisions of the FFDCA did not divest the 
district court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to EPA action under statutory or 
constitutional claims according to 28 U.S.C. § 1331); Nader v. E.P.A., 859 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that because FFDCA § 346(a) and § 348 only allowed appellate review of orders issued 
under sections not implicated in the case at hand, EPA's rejection of petition to revoke pesticide 
tolerance was not appealable to the court of appeals); Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (holding that the appellate review provision § 355(h) of FFDCA applied only to cases chal-
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was not comparable to TRAC analysis of statutes that provide for broader appel-
late review, TRAC did not apply to the plaintiffs claims, and jurisdiction was 
proper.m 
Defendants argued that certain counts should be dismissed as the plain-
tiffs lacked standing. tS4 Defendants asserted that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the 
first two elements of constitutional standing as defined in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife.m Plaintiffs claimed procedural, informational, and economic injury 
because of the EPA's failures. 1S6 The court agreed with the defendants' argument 
that the EPA is not required by statute to produce the information sought by the 
plaintiffs, and therefore the plaintiffs could not base their standing upon informa-
tional or procedural injury.IS7 The court further found the plaintiffs' procedural 
injury failed because they did not identify a legally protected interest infringed 
upon by the EPA's procedural shortcomings. 158 The court held the plaintiffs' 
claims of informational and economic standing also failed to meet the first two 
requirements as set out by Lujan.159 
Defendants' asserted additional counts of the complaint warranted dis-
missal based on the failure of the counts to meet AP A requirements, the plain-
tiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and ripeness.160 Defendants as-
serted the plaintiffs failed to challenge an individual, concrete action of the EPA. 
and instead attacked the general policy provisions of the EPA regarding pesticide 
tolerances and registrations.161 The court reasoned general policy programmatic 
attacks were explicitly refused in Lujan, and therefore dismissed four of plain-
lenging disapproval of new drug regulations, not actual challenges to FDA regulations of new 
drugs); Jamison, 628 F. Supp. 1548 (holding that TRAG allowed for an injunction where the statute 
committed review of FTC action to the appellate court and future review was likely regardless of 
constitutional claims). 
153. See Am. Farm Bureau, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 93. 
154. See id. 
155. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 ( 1992) (to establish the 
constitutional minimum of standing, plaintiffs much show: (l) plaintiff has suffered injury which is 
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not hypothetical or conjectural, (2) a 
causal connection between the injury and the conduct that is traceable to defendant, and (3) it is 
likely the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision). 
156. See Am. Farm Bureau, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 95-96. 
157. See id. at 96. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. at 97. 
160. See id. at 101. 
161. See id. 
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tiffs' claims}62 However, taking judicial review of the EPA's entries in the Fed-
eral Register regarding comments on policy, the court found that those notices 
alone were not enough to merit granting the defendant's motion on the basis of 
APA requirements.'63 The court additionally denied the defendant's exhaustion 
claim under similar reasoning. 164 
The EPA announced a notice of availability, and was seeking public 
comments on a draft Pesticide Registration Notice ("PR-Notice") entitled "Spray 
and Dust Drift Label Statements for Pesticide Products."165 This PR-Notice was 
intended to provide guidance to pesticide registrants and other interested persons 
on drift label statements for pesticide products.166 The goal of this PR-Notice was 
to improve the consistency of product label statements for controlling pesticide 
drift from dust and spray applications, so that human health and the environment 
might be better protected.167 The comment period on this PR-Notice was initially 
scheduled to close on November 20, 2001,168 but was extended until March 31, 
2002 after the Agency received several requests to do so. 169 
V. CLEAN WATER ACT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS 
In American Wildlands v. Carol Browner,110 appellant challenged the 
EPA's approval of some of Montana's water quality standards under the Clean 
Water Act. Under the CW A, states are required to develop water quality stan-
dards for waters within their boundaries.171 In promulgating these standards, 
states must give each body of water a "designated use," determine and set forth 
the degree to which various pollutants may be present in the water body without 
harming the designated use, and provide an "antidegradation review policy" to 
162. See id. at 103-04. 
163. See id. at 106. 
164. See id. 
165. See Pesticides; Draft Guidance for Pesticide Registrants on New Labeling State-
ments for Spray and Dust Drift Mitigation, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,141,44,141 (Aug. 22, 2001). 
166. See Pesticides; Draft Guidance for Pesticide Registrants on New Labeling State-
ments for Spray and Dust Drift Mitigation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 44,141. 
167. See Pesticides; Draft Guidance for Pesticide Registrants on New Labeling State-
ments for Spray and Dust Drift Mitigation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 44,141. 
168. See Pesticides; Draft Guidance for Pesticide Registrants on New Labeling State-
ments for Spray and Dust Drift Mitigation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 44,141. 
169. See Draft Guidance for Pesticide Registrants on New Labeling Statements for Spray 
and Dust Drift Mitigation; Extension of Comment Period, 67 Fed. Reg. 3192,3192 (Jan. 23, 2002). 
170. Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192 (I Oth Cir. 2001 ). 
171. Seeid. at 1194(citing33 U.S.C. § 13l3(d)). 
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allow the states to evaluate any activities that might tend to further degrade water 
quality. 172 The antidegradation review policy must be consistent with the three-
tier federal anti-degradation policy.173 Furthermore, the states must identify any 
body of water that does not meet its standard and set forth a "total maximum 
daily load" (''TMDL") establishing the maximum amount of various pollutants 
that can enter the water body from all sources combined.174 However, EPA regu-
lations permit states to allow water quality requirements to be exceeded in certain 
areas where pollutant discharge initially meets a water body, so-called "mixing 
areas," so long as certain criteria are still met. 175 After developing its standards, 
each state must submit those standards to the EPA for approval.176 If the EPA 
disapproves of the standards, it must notify the state of any necessary changes, 
and if those standards are not made, the EPA is required to impose appropriate 
standards on the state.177 
Appellants challenged the EPA's approval of Montana's antidegradation 
and mixing zone policies.178 Montana's standards had exempted existing non-
point sources from Tier II antidegradation review, and had further exempted sub-
sequent nonpoint sources from such sources when reasonable conservation prac-
tices were used and beneficial uses were protected.179 Montana also exempted 
mixing zones from its antidegradation review policy, so long as the degradation 
to the water body at the periphery of the mixing zone was not significant, al-
though Montana did develop a number of other strict requirements regarding 
mixing areas.180 The district court found that the EPA's approval of these stan-
dards was proper, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 181 
The court first determined that Congress had delegated its authority to 
the EPA to apply and interpret the CW A, both in general and in this specific in-
stance, and its interpretation was therefore entitled to Chevron deference and 
would not be overturned unless the agency's decision was arbitrary and capri-
172. See id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)); 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.3, 130.10(d)(4), 131.6, 
131.10, l3l.l1 ). 
173. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 131.12). 
174. See id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)). 
175. See id. at 1195 (citing EPA, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK§ 5.l.l, at 5-5 
(2d ed. 1994)). 
176. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 131.13). 
177. See id. at 1194 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c)(3)-13l3(c)(4)(A)). 
178. See id. at 1196. 
179. See id. at 1195 (citing MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 75-5-317(2)(a)-75-5-317(b)). 
180. See id. (citing MONT. ADMIN. R. §§ 17.30.715(1)(c), 17.30.505(1)(b), 
17.30.505(1)(c), 17.30.506(1) (2001 )). 
181. See Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Colo. 2000). 
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cious.182 The court then determined that since the CW A does not give the EPA 
the authority to regulate nonpoint source pollution, but instead merely requires 
states to address the issue through their standards and so forth, the EPA was rea-
sonable in interpreting that it could not disapprove an antidegradation policy on 
the sole basis of how that policy addressed the issue of nonpoint source pollu-
tion.183 The court then turned to the EPA's argument that antidegradation review 
requirements apply to a water body as a whole, rather than to a segment such as a 
mixing zone.184 The court found this interpretation was reasonable, especially 
given the practical reality beneath mixing zones, and found the EPA was not ar-
bitrary and capricious in approving Montana's exemption of mixing zones form 
antidegradation review so long as review of the water around such zones indi-
cates that the overall water quality is not being damaged.185 
In Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist. 186, plaintiff alleged defen-
dant's application of a pesticide into its man-made canals without a National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination System permit was a violation of the CW A. 187 The 
district court held the canals were waters of the United States under the CW A, 
and the pesticide was a pollutant.188 However, the district court concluded no 
permit was needed for application because the EPA-approved label on the herbi-
cide, approved under FIFRA, did not require the user to acquire a permit. 189 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed.190 
The court began by stating that it is the duty of the courts to interpret 
statutes so that they may coexist, if possible.191 The court noted FIFRA and the 
CW A serve different purposes, the purpose of comprehensive uniformly safe 
labeling and the purpose of preserving the quality of water.192 An approved label 
establishes general conditions for a pesticides use, while permits for the dis-
charge of pesticides requires consideration of specific, case-by-case environ-
182. See Am. Wildlands, 260 F.3d at 1197. 
183. See id. at 1198. 
184. See id. 
185. Seeid. 
186. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001). 
187. See id. 
188. See id. at 532-34. 
189. See id. at 534. 
190. See id. 
191. See id. at 530-31. 
192. See id. at 531. 
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mental considerations.193 Therefore, the court held a label's failure to specify that 
a permit is required does not mean the CW A does not apply.194 
The court then proceeded to determine whether the district court was cor-
rect in determining the canals to be navigable waters, or waters of the United 
States, in light of the recent Supreme Court holding in Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County, which stated the definition of navigable waters did not 
include isolated, intrastate bodies.195 The court held that the canals still remained 
within the category of navigable waters, despite the fact that the canals could be 
and were isolated by the act of the defendant at certain times, because in general, 
the canal received water from and dispensed water into natural bodies of waters 
that were tributaries of navigable waters, and therefore they were not isolated.196 
In Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 197 plaintiff ranchers who owned the 
surface rights to a property sued the oil and gas properties operator on the ranch 
for the discharge of oil and produced brine into ''navigable waters" under the Oil 
Pollution Act, which defmes navigable waters as waters of the United States.198 
The waters in question were a seasonal creek on the ranch as well as the ground 
water under the ranch. 199 Plaintiff claimed that these waters were covered, as 
Congress wished to extend the jurisdiction of the Act to the extent of the Com-
merce Clause.200 Defendant argued that neither of these waters constituted navi-
gable waters, and the district court agreed and awarded the defendant summary 
judgment.201 The Fifth Circuit affrrmed the summary judgment.202 
The court began by stating that although there was little case law eluci-
dating the extent to which bodies of water are included in the Oil Pollution Act's 
navigable waters jurisdiction, the Oil Pollution Act's definition of navigable wa-
ters wasintended by Congress to be identical with the CWA's defmition of navi-
gable waters; a definition that has been frequently analyzed in courts.203 The 
court proceeded to state that although the Supreme Court has held that the 
CWA's definition of navigable waters is not limited to waters that actually are 
193. 
194. 
195. 
159 (2001). 
196. 
197. 
198. 
199. 
200. 
201. 
202. 
203. 
See id. 
See id. at 532. 
See Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps ofEng'r, 531 U.S. 
See Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 533-34. 
Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001). 
See id. at 265-67. 
See id. at 265. 
See id. at 267-68. 
See id. at 267-72. 
See id. at 265. 
See id. at 267-68. 
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navigable in the traditional sense/04 the broadness of the definition had recently 
been limited by the Court's holding in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County.205 The Court refused to hold Congress had intended to stretch the limits 
of its Commerce Clause power in establishing the jurisdiction of the CW A, and 
appeared to limit jurisdiction to bodies of water that are actually navigable, are 
adjacent to an open body of navigable water, or are otherwise significantly linked 
to an open body of navigable water.206 The court held there was insufficient evi-
dence presented for a reasonable trier of fact to find the seasonal creek at issue in 
this case was either navigable or had any significant connection with an open 
body of navigable water.207 The court proceeded to state that Clean Water Act 
case law was clear that groundwater itself was not navigable water under the 
CW A.208 Therefore, it would be inappropriate to allow a claim based on the dis-
charge of a contaminant into groundwater merely because the contaminant some-
how reached navigable water, since the Act's jurisdiction was limited to dis-
charges that were actually made into the navigable water itself.209 
In a related proceeding, defendant insurers of Harken Exploration Com-
pany appealed the order of the United States District Court, which held insurers 
had a duty to defend Harken in underlying lawsuits.210 Defendants additionally 
appealed the district court's award of the plaintiffs' defense costs for the underly-
ing suits and the use of a ten percent interest rate to calculate prejudgment inter-
est.211 The district court's rulings were affirmed.212 Harken asked appellants to 
defend it in the federal lawsuit filed by the Rices.213 Harken carried two separate 
insurance policies, one issued by each appellant.214 Appellants denied Harken's 
request and refused to defend it in the federallawsuit.215 When the Rices' lawsuit 
was dismissed from federal court and re-filed in state court, Harken again in-
204. See id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985) 
(upholding regulations that CWA restricts discharges into non-navigable "wetlands" adjacent to an 
open body of navigable water)). 
205. See Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County, 531 U.S. at 159. 
206. See Rice, 250 F.3d at 269-70. 
207. See id. at 270-71. 
208. See id. 
209. See id. at 272. 
210. See Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins., 261 F.3d 466,470 (5th Cir. 2001). 
211. See id. 
212. See id. at 478. 
213. See id. at 470. 
214. See id. 
215. See id. 
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formed defendants of the suit and requested defense.216 Appellants refused.217 
Appellants appealed the Dallas Court's grant of partial summary judgment in 
favor of Harken, contending they did not owe Harken a duty to defend because 
there was not an occurrence, as defmed by the policies, that under the policies 
they were only obligated to indemnify, not defend Harken, and the alleged prop-
erty damage did not occur during the policies' coverage periods.218 
The court found the companies had a duty to defend Harken, stating "the 
general rule is that the insurer is obligated to defend if there is, potentially, a case 
under the complaint within the coverage of the policy."219 The Rices alleged an 
occurrence, or accident, against Harken in claiming that the rupture, leak or over-
flow of pollutants contaminated the Ranch's water and damaged the ranch gener-
ally.220 The Rices claimed Harken was negligent in its pollution of the ranch and 
acted maliciously with awareness that its actions would cause property damage.221 
The court disagreed with Appellants' contention that the contaminated water and 
damage to the ranch were not unexpected as they were the natural consequences 
of operating an oil facility. 222 The court found merit with both parties' arguments 
regarding the applicability of the policies to indemnify or defend Harken for 
damage caused by pollutants.223 The court stated that since multiple interpreta-
tions of the policy were reasonable, the policy must be construed against the in-
surer.224 Considering the Rices' allegations of fifty-three occurrences of pollut-
ing, both before and after notice was given to Harken, the court found that the 
damage did occur during the coverage periods of the policies.225 The court addi-
tionally held that Harken's defense costs were reasonable and properly awarded, 
and that the Dallas Court's use of a ten percent interest rate was not in error since 
the parties had not unambiguously and expressly established the amount owed 
under a contract, as per section 302.003 of the Texas Financial Code Anno-
tated.226 
216. See id. 
217. See id. 
218. Seeid. at471. 
219. Jd. 
220. See id. at 473. 
221. See id. 
222. See id. at 474. 
223. See id. at 475. 
224. See id. (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Green Tree Corp., 249 F.3d 389, 392 
(5th Cir. 2001)). 
225. See id. at476-77. 
226. Seeid.at411-18. 
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In Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven,227 plaintiff sued defendant on the basis 
of its past actions as an operator of a landfill and culverts serving the landfill. 
Plaintiff alleged that defendant both violated the RCRA (as a past owner or op-
erator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility,. who had contributed or who 
was contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transporta-
tion, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment), and the Clean Water 
Act (by discharging pollutants into a navigable waterway without a permit).228 
The basis of the claim was the fact that hazardous wastes disposed of into the 
landfill were found to have leached into open bodies of navigable waters and 
their tributaries.229 
The court determined that the defendant had violated the RCRA, but held 
the defendant was not liable under the CW A, because any discharge of the pol-
lutants was entirely in the past, precluding such liability under Gwaltney.230 The 
court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the continuing migration of the pollut-
ants after discharge constituted a continuing discharge in itself.231 
The court's fmding was adhered to upon reconsideration.232 After the 
Town of Brookhaven was found liable under the RCRA for contaminating waters 
juxtaposed to the plaintiffs' properties, the court assessed the full cost of the 
court-appointed expert to the town.233 Defendant objected, claiming the court 
erred in failing to determine whether the resident plai.ntiffs had the capacity to 
pay a portion of the expert's costs.234 The court affirmed its order, finding the 
court had the discretion to assess the costs in whatever manner the court believed 
justified.m It was counter-intuitive to place financial obstacles in the path of 
citizen litigation in the protection of the environment.236 As taxpayers of the 
town, the residents helped finance the town's costs of litigation, including the 
costs of experts.237 Finally, the court found that as working-class residents, im-
227. Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp. 2d 81 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
228. See id. at 104-05. 
229. See id. at 104. 
230. See id. at 120-21. 
231. See id. 
232. See Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 149 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
233. See id. at 13-14. 
234. See id. at 14. 
235. See id. 
236. See id. at 15. 
237. See id. 
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posing additional costs of expert testimony would constitute hardship to the 
plaintiffs. 238 
In Pronso/ino v. Marcus,239 plaintiffs, having applied for a timber-
harvesting permit, received the permit from the California Department of For-
estry with many serious restrictions attached that were designed to reduce soil 
erosion into the Garcia River.240 The EPA designated the Garcia as a water body 
that was in violation of its water quality standards due to nonpoint source pollu-
tion, and thus required the state to establish total maximum daily loads for the 
Garcia.241 The state missed its deadline to submit its own TMDLs, whereupon 
the EPA imposed its own TMDLs on the state.242 The TMDLs established a total 
maximum amount of sediment loading that equated to a sixty percent reduction 
in sediment pollution from all combined sources, including nonpoint sources 
such as timber harvesting.243 The plaintiffs argued the permit restrictions were 
directly caused by the EPA's TMDL standard, as the California Department of 
Forestry would not issue any permit that could violate it, for fear of losing fund-
ing.244 The plaintiff then brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, 
challenging the EPA's interpretation that the Clean Water Act allows it to estab-
lish TMDLs on rivers polluted solely by nonpoint source pollution.245 
The court evaluated the statutory language of the CW A, and noted that 
section 303, which requires the states to create EPA-approved water quality stan-
dards or to have the EPA impose standards upon them, did not draw any distinc-
tions among navigable waters or their pollutants.246 The court instead found the 
mandatory planning process of section 303, in order to insure the adequate im-
plementation of water quality standards for all navigable waters, required the 
EPA to address nonpoint as well as point sources in approving or determining 
TMDLs.247 
238. See id. at 16. 
239. Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
240. See id. at 1338. 
241. See id. at 1339-40. 
242. See id. at 1339. 
243. See id. at 1340. 
244. See id. at 1338-40. 
245. See id. at 1337. 
246. See id. at 1341-47. 
247. See id. at 1347. The district court's decision was upheld by a three-judge panel of 
the appeals court. See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002). The court held that the 
statutory language of§ 303(d), whereby states must identify and compile a list of all waters for 
which certain "effluent limitations are not stringent enough" required the states to identify (I) wa-
ters as to which the effluent limitations applied, but water quality standards were not met and (2) 
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Various federal agencies, including the EPA, Department of the Interior, 
Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, and others, have agreed 
upon a final comprehensive science-based approach to watershed delineation and 
assessment on federal lands.248 Factors affecting the watershed will be consid-
ered when determining the best management practices and priorities for both land 
and water uses.249 The agencies' watershed goals will involve minimizing ad-
verse water quality impacts from management programs, minimizing the im-
pairment of current and future uses, and restoring watersheds that do not reach 
water quality standards.250 
In December 2000, Montana submitted a total maximum daily load plan 
designed to relieve impairments to water quality caused by reduced flow in water 
bodies by adjusting water withdrawal.2SI Although EPA officials commended the 
plan, the EPA refused to set a precedent for approving solely flow-based 
TMDLs, stating that the CW A only required TMDLs for situations resulting from 
pollutants.252 The EPA went on to state that flow alterations are not included in 
the CWA's defmition of a pollutant.m Montana officials stated that the state 
would probably attempt to address water flow concerns on a voluntary basis with 
water users, while focusing its resources on the actually required TMDLs.254 
The EPA has requested comments on its proposed draft for technical 
guidance for managing agriculture nonpoint source pollution.2ss The guidance 
provides background information on the problem as well as information on up-
to-date reduction methods.2S6 The comment period for the notice of a draft, 
which offered technical guidance for managing nonpoint sources of water poilu-
waters as to which effiuent limitations do not apply and water quality standards are not met. See id. 
at 1126. Upon this rationale, TMDL requirements were found to apply to the Garcia River. See id. 
248. See Unified Federal Policy for a Watershed Approach to Federal Land and Resource 
Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 62,566, 62,566 (Oct. 18, 2000). 
249. See Unified Federal Policy for a Watershed Approach to Federal Land and Resource 
Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at 62,569-62,570. 
250. See Unified Federal Policy for a Watershed Approach to Federal Land and Resource 
Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at 62,569-62,570. 
251. See Susan Bruninga, Plan Addressing Flow in Montana Creek Not Caused by 
TMDL Program, EPA Says, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1635 (Aug. 17, 2001). 
252. See id. 
253. See id. 
254. See id. 
255. See Notice of Availability of Guidance for Controlling Nonpoint Source Pollution 
from Agriculture and Request for Comments, 65 Fed. Reg. 61,325,61,325 (Oct. 17, 2000). 
256. See Notice of Availability of Guidance for Controlling Nonpoint Source Pollution 
From Agriculture and Request for Comments, 65 Fed. Reg. at 61,325. 
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tion from agriculture, published on October 17, 2000, required that comments 
sent by mail be postmarked no later than January 16, 2001.257 
VI. CON CENTRA TED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 
In January 2001, the EPA announced a proposed rule that would change 
the permitting requirements for confined animal feeding operations ("CA-
FOs").2ss The EPA asked for comment on two options for defining CAFOs under 
NPDES permitting.2s9 The frrst option would establish a two-tiered system, des-
ignating all facilities with greater than 500 animal units as CAFOs and granting 
discretion to the permitting authority to determine whether smaller facilities are 
CAFOs.260 The other option would establish a three-tiered system, designating 
all facilities with more than 1000 animal units as CAFOs, designating all facili-
ties with 300-1000 animal units that meet certain other conditions as CAFOs, and 
granting discretion to the permitting authority to determine that any facility is a 
CAFO, no matter what the size.261 Under the proposed rule, the number of facili-
ties classified as CAFOs and subject to permitting would increase to as many as 
39,000 from the current level of 2,500.262 The proposed rule would also expand 
permitting to include dry-manure poultry operations and stand-alone immature 
swine and heifer operations.263 EPA officials stated that the new regulations were 
not intended to cover operations that used concentrated feeding practices during 
the winter and stressed the need for public comment and input to cover situations 
257. See Notice of Availability of Guidance for Controlling Nonpoint Source Pollution 
From Agriculture and Request for Comments, 65 Fed. Reg. at 61,325. 
258. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Efflu-
ent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 2960,2960 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122 and 412). 
259. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Efflu-
ent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. 
Reg. at 2960. 
260. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Efflu-
ent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. 
Reg. at 2962. 
261. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Efflu-
ent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. 
Reg. at 2962. 
262. See Terrence J. Centner, EPA Announces Proposed Rule Changes for Animal Feed-
ing Operations, 17 AGRIC. L. UPDATE 1,2 {Sept. 2000). 
263. See id. at 1; Scott Fancher, EPA Announces Proposed Rule Changes for Animal 
Feeding Operations, 17 AGRIC. L. UPDATE 1 {Sept. 2000). 
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they had not thought of.264 Environmentalists were critical of the proposal, in part 
because the proposal did not address the possibility of phasing out lagoons to 
store animal waste.265 As with the TMDL proposal, the CAFO proposed rule 
generated a firestorm of sharply divided comments.266 Agricultural groups con-
tended the proposed requirements for nonpoint pollution were not authorized by 
the CW A, would be excessively costly, and challenged the co-permitting re-
quirements designed to extend responsibility beyond contract growers to the cor-
porations that own the livestock.267 State officials contended the rules would un-
dermine functionally equivalent state programs.268 Environmental groups, how-
ever, supported the proposal as a long overdue regulation ofCAFO's.269 
Prior to issuing the proposed rules, the EPA approved a final project 
agreement to allow egg producers to develop an environmental management sys-
tem and to allow states to issue general CWA permits for these operations.270 The 
EPA viewed the project as a way to bring more of the operations into the regula-
tory regime more quickly, pending a change in the CAFO regime that would in-
clude "dry litter" operations. 271 Environmentalists were critical of the plan, say-
ing that it would "reward some of the most egregious violators of the Clean Wa-
ter Act. "272 
The EPA is also attempting to regulate contamination by atmospheric 
deposition.273 Mercury levels in fish in the Savannah River exceeded state con-
264. See Tripp Waltz, Concentrated Winter Feeding not Covered by EPA Proposal on 
Feedlot Runoff Control, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 605 (Mar. 20, 2001). 
265. See Susan Bruninga, EPA Proposal Could Require Thousands More Feedlots to Get 
Permits 31 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 2659 (Dec. 22, 2000); see also Susan Bruninga, Draft 
CAPO Proposal Would Require Co-Permitting, Revise Threshold Limits, 31 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 
43, at 2316 (Nov. 3, 2000); Susan Bruninga, Most Feedlots Would Have to Apply for NDPES Per-
mits Under EPA Guidance, 31 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1724 (Aug. 18, 2000) (discussing 
various criticisms offered by several environmental organizations); Carolyn Whetzel, Proposal to 
Curb Runoff From Feedlots an 'Administrative Nightmare,' Farmers Say, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 11, at 495 (Mar. 16, 2001) (industrial criticism of the proposed regulation). 
266. See Susan Bruninga, Legality, Strictness of Proposal to Tighten Rules on CAPOs 
Questioned in Comments, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1722 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
267. See id. 
268. See id. at 1723. 
269. See id. 
270. See Susan Bruninga, Environmental Group Vows Fight Over XL Project for Egg 
Producers, 31 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 2325 (Nov. 3, 2000). 
271. See id. at 2326. 
272. Jd.; see generally Thomas R. Head, III, Local Regulation of Animal Feeding Opera-
tions: Concerns, Limits, and Options For Southeastern States, 6 ENVTL. LAW 503 (2000) (discuss-
ing local regulation ofCAFOs). 
273. See Susan Bruninga, EPA Authority to Set TMDL for Mercury From Air Deposition 
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sumption guidelines, and the EPA's final TMDL included mercury, in an attempt 
to lower those levels.274 Comments on the final TMDL regulations contested the 
EPA's jurisdiction to regulate pollution that comes from atmospheric deposition, 
but the EPA backed up its assertion of jurisdiction by citing federal court deci-
sions that affirmed the EPA's authority to regulate based solely on non-point 
sources ofpollution.27s 
Vll. THETMDLPROGRAM 
Established in the 1972 Clean Water Act, the TMDL program provides a 
process for identifying waters that fail to satisfy state water quality standards, 
calculating the total maximum daily loads of a pollutant that a water body can 
assimilate while maintaining applicable water quality standards, and incorporat-
ing TMDLs into the state water quality planning process.276 Recently, the TMDL 
program has become one of the most debated environmental concepts in the 
country, largely due to a revised set of regulations drafted in July 2000.277 Those 
rules specifically provide that nonpoint sources of pollution such as agricultural 
operations are to be included in the TMDL process.278 They also establish a con-
troversial timetable for states to develop TMDLs.279 
Contested in Comments, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 445 (Mar. 9, 2001). 
274. See id. 
275. See id.; Pronsolino, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1345; David K. Bowles, Case Summary: 
Pronsolino v. Marcus EPA May Impose TMDLs for Substandard Rivers Impaired Solely By Non-
point Sources, ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON AGRIC. MGMT. NEWSLETTER, June 2000, at 15; Susan 
Bruninga, Court Rules TMDL Program Can Apply to River Polluted by Nonpoint Sources, 31 En-
v't. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 639 (Apr. 7, 2000). 
276. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to 
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,590 (July 13, 
2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 9). 
277. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to 
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,586. 
278. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to 
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,593. 
279. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to 
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,590-43,591. 
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With citizen suits and inconsistent court orders, the EPA convened a 
committee in 1996 under the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("F ACA") to ad-
dress the TMDL issue directly.280 The FACA Committee was comprised of di-
verse groups including agricultural, industrial, and environmental interests.281 
While its members were able to achieve considerable agreement on a number of 
important issues, the Committee split on the question of how the TMDL process 
should be used to address nonpoint source pollution.282 In March 2000, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office ("GAO") issued its first report highlighting a substantial 
lack of data available to determine which water bodies were impaired and to set 
appropriate TMDLs.283 The GAO published a second report in June 2000, ques-
tioning the reasonableness of EPA's economic analysis of the proposed regula-
tions.284 
A final rule revising the TMDL program was issued in July 2000.285 
Nonpoint sources were included in the TMDL program, and states were required 
to establish TMDL's by mid-2002.286 The revisions were immediately chal-
lenged by several groups representing industries that are primarily point source 
producers of pollution and agriculture groups concerned primarily about the 
regulation ofnonpoint source pollutions.287 
The EPA has proposed an eighteen month delay to the effective date of 
the final rule issued on July 13, 2000, which revises the CWA's Total Maximum 
Daily Load Rule.288 If the EPA's proposal were accepted, the effective date of 
280. See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework for the Clean Water Act's 
Ambient Standards Program, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) I 0,415, 10,422 (Aug. 1998). 
281. See id. 
282. Seeid. 
283. See GAO, Water Quality, Key EPA and State Decisions Limited by Inconsistent and 
Incomplete Data, GAOIRCED-00-54 (Mar. 2000). 
284. See GAO, Review of Two EPA Proposed Regulations Regarding Water Quality 
Management, GAOIRCED-00-206R TMDL Regulations (June 2000). 
285. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to 
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,586 (July 13, 
2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 9). 
286. Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions 
to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to the 
Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,588, 43,617. 
287. See Susan Bruninga, Nine Petitions Filed in Major Fight Over Final Rule Revising 
TMDL Program, 31 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2618 (Dec. 15, 2000); see also Lisa E. Roberts, 
Note, Is the Gun Loaded This Time? EPA's Proposed Revisions to the Total Maximum Daily Load 
Program, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 635 (2000). 
288. See Delay of Effective Date of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Man-
agement Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Pro-
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the July 13, 2000 final rule would be extended from October 1, 2001 to April30, 
2003.289 The July 2000 final rule had a spending prohibition attached to it, which 
will expire on September 30, 2001, and unless Congress or the EPA takes action, 
the rule is scheduled to go into effect thirty days later on October 1, 2001.290 In 
light of the numerous concerns expressed by organizations, pending litigation in 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals/91 and a Congressional mandated report enti-
tled "Assessing the TMDL Approach to Water Quality Management," issued by 
the National Research Council ("NRC") of the National Academy of Science, 
which recommends the TMDL program be changed in certain respects,292 the 
EPA believes that it would be prudent to extend the effective date, to allow time 
for a reconsideration and re-proposal of certain aspects of the July 2000 rule.293 
Currently, the program continues to operate under the 1985 TMDL regulations, 
which were amended in 1992.294 In addition, acting under further suggestion by 
the NRC report, the EPA has proposed to extend the deadline for States to submit 
their next list of impaired waters from April1, 2002 to October 1, 2002.29s Writ-
ten comments on this proposed rule were being accepted up until September 10, 
2001.296 Comments on the proposed delay in implementation of the TMDL pro-
gram were extensive and sharply divided.297 Environmental groups opposed de-
lay, but farm groups and industrial dischargers supported the delay.298 Farm 
groups in particular objected to the rule's regulation ofnonpoint source pollution 
as beyond the EPA's authority, and required implementation plans as federal 
presumption of local land-use policy.299 These groups also supported the delay 
gram in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulations; and 
Revision of the Date for State Submission of the 2002 List of Impaired Waters, 66 Fed. Reg. 
41,817, 41,817 (Aug. 9, 2001)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, and 130) [hereinaf-
ter Delay of Effective Date]. 
289. See Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. at 41819. 
290. See Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. at 41819. 
291. The Federal Water Quality Coalition filed one of about a dozen petitions for review 
of the July 2000 rule. Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Whitman, No. 00-1320 (D.C. Cir. July 18, 2000). 
292. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, AsSESSING THE TMDL APPROACH TO WATER 
QUALITY MANAGEMENT (2001), available at http://www.nap.edu. 
293. See Susan Bruninga, Environmental Advocates Oppose Delay in TMDL Rule; Indus-
try, Ag Groups Supportive, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1828 (Sept. 21, 2001). 
294. See NATIONAL RESEARCH CoUNCIL, supra note 292, at 15. 
295. See Bruninga, supra note 290, at 1829. 
296. See id. at 1828. 
297. See id. 
298. See id. 
299. See id. at 1828-29. 
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for states to submit their lists of impaired waters.300 Since the close of the com-
ment period, many environmental organizations have grown dissatisfied with the 
rule currently under consideration, labeled the "Watershed Rule" by EPA offi-
cials, and have asked the agency "to scrap the rulemaking altogether," preferring 
the EPA to concentrate on implementing the 1992 rule instead. 301 Environmental 
organizations are afraid the new rule will not require the EPA to implement 
TMDLs in states that fail to do so on their own.302 The centerpiece of the new 
rule is a "continuous planning process" ("CPP") called for in § 303( e) of the 
CWA.303 The CPP basically consolidates into one plan all the CWA water qual-
ity requirements found in other sections.304 The TMDL program would therefore 
be integrated into the CPP. These CPPs would be developed by the states to ad-
dress watershed problems, and would only be subject to review by the EPA once 
every five years to determine if water quality objectives were being met.305 
Vill. WETLANDS REGULATION 
In Branstad v. Veneman306 plaintiff farmers repaired a tile drainage sys-
tem on their farmland, with permission from the USDA. The USDA asserted its 
approval only extended to the system on one area of the wetlands, rather than the 
wetlands at issue.307 The Branstads sued the USDA alleging the department erro-
neously converted protected wetlands to crop use and arbitrarily refused to con-
sider the plaintiffs' administrative appeatl08 The court concluded the Branstads 
made the requisite showing of irreparable harm because they could not be fully 
compensated for the intangible value of the farming operation or the intangible 
costs of their likely bankruptcy.309 Reiterating the importance of the prevention 
300. See id. The EPA subsequently circulated a draft report on the total estimated costs 
of the TMDL program which reported the costs to industry to implement the TMDL program could 
range from under $1 billion to $4.3 billion annually. See EPA, The National Costs of the Total 
Maximum Daily Load Program (Draft Report), EPA 841-D-01-003 (Aug. 2001). 
301. Susan Bruninga, Water Quality Standards: Some Reform of Impaired Waters Pro-
gram May Be Achieved in Guidance, Official Says, 33 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1808 (Aug. 
16, 2002). 
302. 
303. 
304. 
305. 
306. 
307. 
308. 
309. 
See id., at 1809. 
See id., at 1808-09. 
See id. 
Seeid. 
Branstad v. Veneman, 145 F. Supp. 2d lOll (N.D. Iowa 2001). 
See id. at 1014. 
See id. at 1014-1016. 
See id. at I 024. 
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of wetlands conversion, the court found the public policy interests of the 
"Swarnpbuster" Act could not justify arbitrary agency action or the failure to 
maintain the status quo while judicial review is undertaken.310 The court granted 
the Branstad's motion for preliminary injunction enjoining the USDA's enforce-
ment actions against the Branstad's for conversion of wetlands and failure to 
comply with a restoration agreement for that tract.311 
After the court granted the plaintiffs' request for an injunction, the de-
fendant secretary moved for reconsideration.312 The secretary filed a motion un-
der rule 60(b ), the "exceptional circumstances" standard, of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.313 The court denied the motion, doubting that the secretary could 
either satisfy the due diligence factor required for obtaining rule 60(b) relief, or 
produce "newly discovered evidence" that would warrant a different result.314 
While the court found that the secretary had correctly and timely filed its 
motion for relief from a judgment of an order under rule 60(b),m the court held 
that the secretary had relied upon the wrong standard ("manifest error") instead 
of the rule 60(b) standard of "adequate showing of exceptional circumstances," 
premised upon "newly discovered evidence. "316 In order to prevail under rule 
60(b), the movant must show "(1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) due 
diligence was exercised to discover the evidence; (3) the evidence is material ... 
and (4) the evidence is such that a new trial would probably produce a different 
result."317 The court doubted the USDA's efforts to expedite recovery of the evi-
dence during the preliminary injunction hearing, but relied on the "more funda-
mental deficiencies" of the change in result prong.318 
The "newly discovered evidence" that the USDA cited in its appeal dealt 
with the finding that the Branstads had mailed their appeal to the wrong address, 
not that the National Appeals Division's (''NAD") office had lost the request.319 
The court did not fmd that this evidence would have changed the results of the 
preliminary injunction, as it did not generate an inference that the wrong address 
was the primary reason for the NAD's rejection of the request for considera-
310. See id. at 1025. 
311. See id. at 1026. 
312. See Branstad v. Veneman, No. C01-3030-MWB, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10543 
(N.D. Iowa July 19, 2001). · 
313. See id. at *6. 
314. See id. at *14, *16. 
315. Seeid.at*10-*11. 
316. See id. at *11. 
317. /d.at*14. 
318. Seeid.at*15. 
319. Seeid.at*5. 
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tion.320 The court rejected the USDA's argument that the outcome would have 
been changed because the failure to receive the request was based on the negli-
gence of the Branstads in mailing the request to the wrong address and not the 
fault of the agency.321 
Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought review of the USDA's decision that 
they had violated the Swampbuster Act.322 The court revised the agency's deter-
minations that the plaintiffs administrative appeal had been rendered moot by 
their entry into a wetlands restoration agreement.323 The court held the director's 
decision had been an abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious, and contrary to 
law; as such, it could not stand.324 
In Prokop v. USDA,m plaintiff farmer sought review of a USDA 
determination classifying his property as farmed wetland pasture.326 Plaintiff 
informed the defendant of his intent to clean out a drainage canal on his farm to 
protect his continued eligibility for farm program benefits.327 Defendant 
inspected the plaintiffs farm and classified two areas as farmed wetland pasture 
under the "Swampbuster" Act.328 Plaintiff exhausted his appeals of this 
classification through all agency channels.329 The court found that the record 
supported the USDA's classification, and the plaintiff was disqualified from 
federal farm program benefits.330 
Brace v. United Statesl31 concerned plaintiffs purchase of two parcels of 
land in 1975 from his father with the intent to carry on the family farming busi-
ness.332 The government claimed, ''plaintiff purchased the property with the in-
tent of integrating [it] into [a] larger 600 acre operation."333 Plaintiff claims he 
cleared, leveled and drained the property, and began to grow crops on the site in 
1976.334 Defendant asserts that the plaintiff did not begin to farm the land until 
320. See id. at *24. 
321. See id. 
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1986.335 Plaintiff received three orders to refrain from further disturbing the area, 
and in the summer of 1988, requested his property receive the status of "com-
menced conversion from wetlands" prior to December 23, 1985.336 The United 
States filed an enforcement action against the plaintiff and subsequently the dis-
trict court entered a Consent Decree enjoining the plaintiff from operating and 
maintaining the drainage system. 337 "Plaintiff complied with the court decree by 
eliminating the drainage system. "338 Plaintiff filed suit alleging that as a result, a 
substantial portion of the property was unusable for his farming operation and 
had been taken from him for public benefit without just compensation.339 
Plaintiff claimed he could not have been aware that the federal jurisdic-
tion and authority extended to his property under the Clean Water Act when he 
purchased and began farming the land because jurisdiction had not been extended 
until 1977.340 The court held that the plaintiff knew the character of the land was 
wetlands at the time of purchase, knew "the soil and conservation plans were 
prepared for his father, [and] knowingly took a risk that environmental regula-
tions would become more stringent when he fail[ ed] to promptly apply for a sec-
tion 404 permit." 341 
In Borden Ranch Partnership v. United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers,342 real estate developer Tsakopoulos brought an action challenging the 
authority of the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA to regulate 
deep ripping of wetlands.343 The Corps filed a counterclaim seeking injunctive 
relief and civil penalties for developer's alleged violations of the CW A.344 Tsa-
kopoulos purchased a ranch that had primarily been used for cattle grazing with 
the intent to convert the ranch into a vineyard and orchards and subdivide into 
smaller parcels for sale.345 For the vineyards and orchards to grow, "deep-
ripping" was required.346 Tsakopolous was issued a retrospective permit to deep 
rip part of the property, but not the area containing vernal pools, and with restric-
335. 
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tions on the depth of the deep ripping in the areas containing swales.347 The 
Corps subsequently discovered that deep ripping had occurred in protected wet-
lands and issued a cease and desist order.348 Tsakopolous continued to deep rip 
without a pennit.349 Tsakopolous claimed regulators were abusing their authority 
by applying law to normal farming and ranching activities, which were exempt 
from the CWA.350 The appellate court concluded that normal plowing could be 
regulated under the CW A if it significantly changed the flow of water into nearby 
navigable waters.m Tsakopolous' conversion of ranch lands into vineyards and 
orchards was found to be a change in the use of the land, radically altering the 
regime of protected wetlands.352 The court found the Corps and the EPA exer-
cised proper authority and jurisdiction over the area.m 
Plaintiff landowner appealed the final order in favor of the Army Corps 
of Engineers.354 The court affrrmed defendants' jurisdiction over the land 
owner's activities, reversed the findings of violations in the vernal pool because 
it exceeded defendant's jurisdiction, affrrmed the finding of deep ripping in the 
swales, and remanded the civil penalties for recalculation because of the reversal 
of the vernal pool violation.m 
On appeal, the government conceded the ruling in Solid Waste precludes 
the Corps' authority over the vernal pool in dispute and withdrew its enforcement 
claim with respect to the pooJ.356 The court accordingly reversed the district 
court's findings ofCWA violations in the vernal pooJ.357 
The court concluded that there was no merit in plaintiff landowner's 
three challenges to the court's calculation of a civil penalty.358 First, plaintiff 
contended ''the penalty should have been based on the number of days in which 
the illegal ripping occurred, not on the number of individual passes with the rip-
per."359 He argued "that the statutory language per day for each violation means 
that he can only be assessed $25,000 for any day in which ripping violations oc-
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curred, regardless of the total number of rippings in that day."360 The court dis· 
agreed and held that the better rule is to treat each rip as a separate violation as it 
is more in line with the statutory language, with prior judicial interpretations, and 
with the general policy goal of discouraging pollution.361 Under plaintiff's read-
ing, individuals would be encouraged to "stack all their violations into one 'Pol-
lution Day,' in which innumerable offenses could occur, subject only to the 
$25,000 maximum."362 The court did, however, remand to the District Court for 
a recalculation reducing the penalty because of the elimination of the vernal pool 
findings.363 
The dissent argued that "return of soil in place after deep plowing is not a 
'discharge of a pollutant,"' and therefore, not subject to section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act. 364 If deep ripping was prohibited by the CW A, Congress should have 
spoken specifically to that act, as returning soil is not equivalent with adding 
pollutants as Congress described in the Act.365 The dissent concluded that the 
policy decision made by the majority should be made by Congress, that the 
court's decision went beyond statutory interpretation and that Congress should 
speak explicitly on this subject if it wishes to regulate such farming actions.366 
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on this decision, to be argued in the fall 
term of 2002.367 
The Corps issued a new and modified section 404 Nationwide Permits 
("NWP") to replace NWP 26 in March 2000.368 The old NWP 26 allowed devel-
opment on up to three acres without an individual section 404 permit.369 The new 
program applies to activities of one half acre or less which do not occur in tidal 
wetlands, provides additional protection for wetlands in 1 00-year floodplains, 
and requires notice to the Corps if an activity will destroy more than one tenth of 
an acre (as opposed to one third of an acre under the prior NWP program).370 
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In addition, the scope of agricultural activities allowed in wetland areas 
has been expanded to include dredge and fill activities on up to one-half acre of 
wetlands in order to improve agricultural production.371 Before the modifica-
tions, NWP 40 had been limited to agricultural building construction.372 There-
visions also used the term "farm tract" rather than farm, allowing multiple NWP 
40s to be issued for a single farming operation, as long as the operation is divided 
into multiple farm tracts.373 The revised regulation prohibits Regional Army 
Corps Districts from placing more protective regional conditions on NWP 40 
participants, but states are free to place more stringent state requirements on the 
permits or to revoke NWP 40 certification completely.374 
The EPA issued a final rule as of August 16, 2000, to strengthen section 
404 ofthe CWA, known as the Tulloch rule,375 which regulates the re-depositing 
of dredged materials into wetlands, including agricultural wetlands.376 In re-
sponse to the comments received on the proposed rule, the final rule incorporates 
several modifications.m The language of the final rule has been revised to clar-
ify that the burden of proof has not shifted to the regulated community, with re-
spect to defining what constitutes regulable discharge.378 Secondly, a defmition 
of "incidental fallback" has been supplied in the regulatory language, and was 
derived from past preamble discussion of the issue, and is consistent with rele-
vant court decisions involving the term.379 The fmal rule is expected to increase 
the protection of the Nation's water resources, including wetlands, as well as 
provide increased levels of predictability for the regulated community.380 The 
final rule follows a case-by-case method of analysis to determine whether or not 
the dredged materials or a regulable discharge resulted from a particular activity, 
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thus providing the flexibility necessary to adequately address varying fact-
patterns.381 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Ironically, the firestorm of disagreements between environmental and ag-
ricultural interests has led to one point of agreement in the upcoming Congres-
sional debates over farm bill legislation. Environmental advocates, municipal 
organizations, and agricultural groups agree that Congress should provide more 
funding for conservation programs for agriculture. The House Agriculture 
Committee approved legislation that would provide approximately $16 billion 
over ten years for soil, water and wildlife conservation programs, or about $1.2 
billion annually for the Environmental Quality Incentives Program.382 Nearly 
half of that amount would go for the first time to livestock producers, including 
CAFO's.383 Municipal organizations also support the Working Lands Steward-
ship Act of 2001 with authorization for $6 billion to farmers, ranchers, and for-
esters to preserve open space, improve water quality, protect public health, and 
create habitat for protected species.384 Environmental groups support an even 
more generous bill that would nearly triple the funding of agricultural conserva-
tion programs.385 The critical difference in their support is that agriculture views 
the fmancial subsidies as an alternative to regulation, while municipal and envi-
ronmental groups view them as a supplement to broader regulation. Whichever 
view prevails, it appears likely that the Conservation Reserve and Wetlands Re-
serve programs will be more generously funded, as will most agricultural conser-
vation programs. Disagreement, once again, will be over how much of that fund-
ing should be available to livestock producers. In every sense, the upcoming 
farm bill debates promise to be over "pork barrel politics." 
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